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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ownership structures can differ with respect to the degree of ownership concentration and with respect to the 
type of owners. In the literature, relatively much attention has been paid to the degree of ownership 
concentration and its effects. In this article we will consider the cross-country differences in type of owners, a 
less frequently studied but potentially important object. The type of ownership is not only important for the 
way the owners can control management (the main topic for studies on ownership concentration) but also with 
respect to the objective of the firm. Firms can have varies objectives, such as a high profit, a dominant 
position in the market, and continuity of the firm. Although one can safely assume that all these objectives are 
of more or less importance for every firm, their relative importance can differ significantly between 
companies.  
 The identity of the owner is an important explanatory variable for the relative importance of the various 
objectives of a firm. In general, widely held firms will put relatively much weight on maximizing profits, 
whereas firms owned by families will put more weight on continuity. This may have consequences for the 
level of profits, the number of employees, and the type of industry in which each of these types of firms 
operate. State owned enterprises need not necessarily strive for profit maximization, which can lead to less 
innovation than the privately held competitors. Another consequence might be that it can build a strategic 
position in a particular branch. A strategy which might be impossible for privately held companies because of 
the long period during which one as to face losses or because the governments involved would never allow a 
privately held company to build such a dominant position. Especially in the literature on transition economies, 
it is often claimed that firms owned by foreigners increase the level of competition in an economy. So overall 
one can conclude that the differences in identity of owners can have far reaching consequences for the 
structure of national economies and its performance.  
Several recent cross-country studies have found quite large differences in ownership patterns in different 
countries. La Porta et al. (1999) report the data on the number of firms with different types of largest ultimate 
owners within the 20 largest listed firms and ten ‘medium-size’ firms in 27 countries. Pedersen and Thomsen 
(1998) present a similar analysis for the 100 largest companies in fourteen European countries. Faccio and 
Lang (2002) analyze ownership patterns using a sample covering most of the publicly listed firms in thirteen 
European countries (with coverage ranging from 67 firms in Ireland to 1953 firms in the UK), and Claessens 
et al. (2002) perform this task for eight East Asian countries.  
The previous studies show several shortcomings. First and most obvious, the coverage of even 
industrialized nations is not comprehensive. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, are not included in 
any of the comparative analyses, and Denmark and the Netherlands are not included in an analysis on large 
samples of firms. The papers differ in the methodology used, the issues addressed, and the data contained in 
the datasets, so that the figures are comparable only on a very limited range of indicators. 
Second, the literature mentioned does not adequately address the influence of the size of firms (and 
thus of countries) on ownership patterns. There are several reasons to expect that larger firms are widely held 
and have a smaller probability of being owned by a family. Larger firms need more external capital, which is 
more difficult to obtain from a limited number of investors. Larger firms are more attractive for investment by 
arm’s-length investors, for several reasons: information disclosure and corporate governance requirements 
imposed on these firms by the government are usually stricter; larger firms attract more and more detailed 
analyst following; smaller firms often are focused on one product, process and idea, making investment in 
them more risky; larger firms tend to be better known, and investment in them may give a feeling of security. 
Empirically, the fact that larger firms tend to have a less concentrated ownership structure is well established. 
An important consequence of this is that country differences observed in ownership patterns may in part 
reflect differences in size of the firms and not true country differences. A comparison of the numbers of firms 
with different values of the stake of the dominant shareholder within a given number (say, a twenty or 
hundred) of the largest firms in different countries, as well as comparison of all firms in the sample, may lead 
to erroneous conclusions. Previous studies addressed this issue, by taking a certain (relatively low) value of 
firm size and comparing an equal number (ten or fifty) of firms above this cut-off, so that ‘small’ or ‘medium-
sized’ firms could be compared. This procedure, however, is not really an adequate solution. In countries with 
a small number of firms in the sample, the largest firm in the ‘medium-size’ group will be much larger than 
the largest firm in a country with many firms in the sample.
1
  Hence the conclusions on ownership patterns are 
then related to size and not to other differences between countries.  
                                                 
1 As an example, La Porta and colleagues compare ten firms with market capitalization immediately above $500mln. The largest of these 
ten in our sample in the USA has a market capitalization of $514mln, and in Portugal – of $13,060mln. 
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Several issues are either not addressed or addressed insufficiently in the studies mentioned above. 
First, the attention of the cross-country studies has focused on attempting to identify ultimate owners of firms. 
While this is important, the pattern of direct ownership is no less or even more important for many issues. For 
instance, if a given investor owns more than 50 percent of voting rights in a firm, this firm cannot be taken 
over, regardless of whether this investor is a person or a company in which the largest ultimate owner has only 
20 percent of votes. Likewise, for large corporations management and monitoring by owners, requires 
professionalism, and the ultimate third- or fourth-tier owners, if they are individuals, are unlikely to do such 
monitoring themselves. It would be delegated to the managers of the lower-tier company, and the objectives, 
capacities and practices of these managers will probably not differ much from those of managers in a widely-
held corporation. 
Second, the previous studies emphasize the role of the largest shareholder (or sometimes, for some 
reason, three largest shareholders as a unit) at the expense of attention to the role of other shareholders and 
their interaction with the largest shareholders. There are reasons to expect that such interactions would be very 
important in practice. A large second shareholder may curb the dilution by the largest shareholder. At the 
same time, if the interests of these shareholders are similar, the largest shareholder may achieve its goals with 
a lesser ownership stake. Furthermore, the different types of shareholders can differ importantly in their 
investment objectives. For some investors the return on equity is the only objective. Other investors (families, 
government, non-financial company) have an association with a firm besides that of equity ownership, and 
this association may be more important for them than extracting the maximum short-term return on their 
investment. Thus, in many cases they are likely to demand policies that are not the best from the point of view 
of arm’s-length shareholders. Furthermore, such investors are very unlikely to sell shares to someone who 
makes a financially attractive offer since the purpose of the shareholding is to cement the other association 
with the firm. At the same time, by threatening to reduce their stake, these investors may provide a powerful 
restraint on dilution by the largest shareholder and/or by management. 
Third, except for Pedersen and Thomsen (1998) the literature did not pay attention to the industry 
aspect of ownership patterns. There are reasons to expect that optimal ownership structures differ for firms 
engaging in different types of economic activities, and thus optimal ownership structures and empirical 
ownership patterns, in different industries may differ.
2
 Industries can differ with respect to the degree of 
commitment that is needed from all the stakeholders concerned. Concentrated shareholdings and the presence 
of stable shareholders such as a family or the state may encourage closer relationships with stakeholders and 
their commitment. If shareholders are interested in returns of the company over a long period, it will be in 
their interests to honor their part of implicit relationship obligations and commitments. If, however, they are 
interested only in short-term returns on their shares, shareholders may well choose not to honor the implicit 
contracts, redistribute wealth in this way to themselves, and exit the firm (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). 
Clearly, the latter is more likely to be the case for small shareholders in widely held firms. Moreover the 
commitment to honoring implicit contracts, is more credible for large block holders, because they cannot exit 
the firm without substantial decrease in share price and thus without losses to themselves. Thus, they would 
be more committed to the firm and its long-term prospects (Franks and Mayer, 1994). At the same time, close 
relationships of shareholders with firms may make it more difficult to go out of commitments with 
stakeholders when it is necessary for the firm’s functioning, and thus may be detrimental for flexibility (Carlin 
and Mayer, 2002). Theoretical and empirical research indicates that the degree of flexibility needed may differ 
between industries. Huang and Xu (1999) show theoretically that widely held firms with many arm’s-length 
relationships may be superior in accomplishing projects with high uncertainty of the outcome, while close 
relationships may be superior for projects with low uncertainty Concentrated ownership and shares in hand of 
long-term shareholders thus may be more advantageous in industries where the character of activities makes 
commitment of stakeholders vital, while dispersed ownership patterns may be superior for industries where 
flexibility is more important and outcomes are more uncertain. 
This has several important implications. To the extent country-specific factors impede the formation 
of certain ownership structures, this may hamper the development of the corresponding industries in this 
countries. On the other hand, country differences observed in ownership patterns may in part reflect 
differences in industry composition and not true differences in country-specific factors.  
The aim of our research project is to remedy these shortcomings. We construct a dataset covering 24 
industrialized nations using a unified methodology, which allows us to come out with analyses covering most 
of the industrialized world. In this paper we concentrate on the nature of large shareholders, and patterns of 
direct ownership.
3
 We do not only study country patterns and differences but also the influence of size and 
industry. In this respect we pay in particular attention to making comparisons on the basis of comparable 
                                                 
2 See Pedersen and Thomsen (1998) for more arguments. 
3 In related papers we also want to study the degree of ownership concentration, separation of ownership and control, the role of stable 
shareholdings, the role of the second shareholder, the relative role of the largest owner and other stable shareholders. 
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units. One of our goals is to analyze to what extent differences in size and industry composition impact (and 
thus distort) the country-level indicators of ownership patterns.  
 The setup of this paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly describe the dataset used. Section 3 
investigates the pattern of types of owners (family, government etc.) among countries and industries. Section 
4 contains an econometric analysis relating ownership structures to firm’s size, type of industry and country. 
Six main types of industry are distinguished, and a more in depth analysis is conducted for manufacturing, 
which itself contains 22 industries. A comparison with previous studies is performed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
THE DATASET 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on a newly constructed dataset for 6668 publicly traded corporations in 24 
countries. The primary source of our data is the ownership database of Thomson Banker. Thomson collects 
this information from a number of sources including, but not limited to, official company-issued statements 
and the media. We collected the information for the firms in 24 countries; all countries where a sufficient 
firms with reliable data were present in the database. We collect information for all non-financial firms (one-
digit primary SIC code other than 6) with data on ownership, stock market capitalization, and primary SIC 
code. However, for Japan and the United States, because of the time and cost constraints, we collect 
information only on one third of the firms present in the database, evenly spread by size and industry. More 
precisely, in each of these countries we divided the firms into ten groups according to size, within each of 
these ten groups we arranged the firms by the 4-digit primary SIC code. Within each of these industries (based 
on 4-digit primary SIC code) we ordered the firms according to size and took every third firm from this list, 
starting from the third.  
In several cases the information in Thomson Banker was not satisfactory. In such cases we augmented 
the dataset with information from other sources, primarily company websites and annual reports.
4  
In 
particular, for firms with dual-class shares the information from Thomson Banker is not sufficient, since it 
reflects the ownership structure of only one class of shares. In many instances (especially in Scandinavia), 
these are actually the shares with subordinate voting rights, mostly because the shares with full voting rights 
are not listed. We identify the companies with dual class shares via Datastream. Fifteen companies of this type 
for which we could not find data from alternative sources are excluded from the sample. 
 
In some cases the total percentage of shareholdings reported by Thomson was greater than 100%. For 
five of these companies we could not find information from alternative sources and excluded them from the 
dataset. In some cases the fraction of total shareholding reported by Thomson Banker is quite low, raising 
doubts about the presence of all substantial shareholders in this dataset. For companies where the fraction of 
total shareholding reported was less than 10%, we collected information using other sources, and were often 
able to identify investors holding very substantial fractions of shares. Forty-eight of these companies where 
we could not find ownership information were excluded from the dataset. Finally, we exclude from the dataset 
companies where the largest equity stake at the moment of reporting was larger than 20% and was held by the 
company itself (four companies) or a broker-dealer firm (five companies). This procedure resulted in a dataset 
of 6668 firms from 24 industrial countries.  
For each firm the dataset includes its industry affiliation, some financial characteristics, and the latest 
available (in July 2004) data on: 
.  the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder; 
. the percentage of shares held and the type of shareholders owning more than 10 percent of shares; 
. the percentage of shares held and the type of stable shareholders (holding more than 3 percent of shares) – 
for firms where such shareholders together own more than 20 percent of shares, or where there is a 
shareholders owning more than 10 percent of shares. 
 
Eight different types of shareholder are distinguished (see Section 3 for details). We treat as stable 
shareholders all shareholders that hold 3 or more percent of voting rights, except when these shareholders are: 
insurance companies, pension funds, trusts, ‘investment advisors’ and broker-dealers. To identify ultimate 
ownership patterns, we also collected, using the same procedure, the information on all listed firms – financial 
as well as non-financial – that are not included in the main dataset but are shareholders in the firms in the 
main dataset. These firms themselves, however, are not included in our analysis. 
                                                 
4 Additional sources of information include: for Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal, Euronext (www.euronext.com); for 
Germany, http://ir-service.onvista.de; for Italy, the website of the securities markets authority (www.consob.it). For Canadian and US firms, 
additional information was collected from annual reports and proxy statements available on websites of securities markets authorities 
(www.sedar.com and www.sec.gov).  
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In the rest of the paper we use the following convention: if the largest shareholder of a firm has more 
than 20% of voting rights, this shareholder is called dominant; if this shareholder has more than 50% of voting 
rights, this shareholder is called majority shareholder.  
 
TYPES OF OWNERS 
 
In this section we analyze the ownership patterns by owner types. The following eight ownership types are 
distinguished: 
Family. An individual or family. 
Listed non-financial company. A domestic listed non-financial firm. 
Government. A national or regional government authority (domestic or foreign) or government agency. 
Foreign. A company with a foreign business address. 
Institutional investor. Investment fund, bank trust, pension fund, or insurance company. 
Bank. A bank holding shares on its own accord. 
Non-profit. A non-profit organization (charity, foundation, cooperative). 
Unlisted company. A domestic company not listed on stock exchange. This category includes all the 
firms classified as ‘corporations’ by Thomson Financial (and thus may include both non-financial and 
financial firms), and private equity funds and venture firms. 
 
    < Table 1 and Table 2> 
 
Table 1 shows the number of firms of different types in each country and Table 2 presents the percentages of 
these firms, relative to the country totals. Widely held firms, family-controlled firms and firms controlled by 
an unlisted company are by far the most important types of companies in the sample and are the three most 
important categories in 16 countries, and among the four most important categories in five further countries. 
Slightly less than 50 percent of the firms in the sample are widely held. The percentage varies from nine 
percent in Hong Kong to 74 percent in Ireland. Nineteen percent of firms are under direct family control, with 
variation from three percent (in Portugal) to 43 percent (in Italy). In Portugal almost 60 percent of firms are 
controlled by an unlisted company, while in Ireland there are no such firms. Control by listed non-financial 
companies is important in Israel, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. Foreign-controlled firms are relatively prominent 
in Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland. The state is a 
significant shareholder in some firms in all countries except Canada, Ireland, Portugal and the USA. In 
Austria, Italy, and Singapore government-controlled firms are relatively important. In Denmark, firms with a 
non-profit organization as a dominant owner play an important role. In no country do banks and institutional 
investors play an important role as a dominant shareholder. 
We also look at indirect ownership. To this purpose we identified the dominant owners of the listed 
domestic non-financial companies. When these are listed domestic companies themselves, we identified their 
dominant owners, till we came to a dominant owner that is not a listed company or to a situation when there is 
no dominant owner. In the former case we classified the firm as (indirectly) controlled by this dominant 
owner; if this owner is a family, the firm is classified as (indirectly) controlled by a family, etc. In the latter 
case we classified the firm as controlled by widely held non-financial firm. Furthermore, following the 
previous literature (La Porta et al.; Claessens et al.; Fascio and Lang) we classified unlisted companies as 
family-controlled firms.  
Of the 355 listed non-financial companies controlling other companies in our sample, there are 241 
which are themselves ultimately widely held, 38 are controlled by a family, 46 by an unlisted company, 12 by 
the government, six  by a foreign agent, two  by an institutional investor, another two by a non-profit 
organization, and one by a bank. For eight listed companies controlling the companies in the sample we could 
not trace owners, and exclude them from the analysis of second-tier ownership patterns. 
 
    < Table 3  and Table 4>  
 
Table 3 shows the numbers of firms of different types in each country, and Table 4 the percentages of these 
firms, relative to the country totals. Widely held firms or firms directly or indirectly controlled by families are 
the two most important categories in all countries except Hong Kong, where there are more foreign-controlled 
firms than widely held firms. Families directly or indirectly control 38 percent of the firms, ranging from 11 
percent in Ireland to 78 percent in Portugal. Interestingly, Portugal has the lowest percentage of all countries 
of firms directly controlled by families. Control by widely held non-financial firms is much more prominent 
in Japan than elsewhere, and in Israel, Korea and Spain this type of shareholder is also important. The 
inferences for other types of shareholders are similar to those made in analyzing direct ownership. 
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     < Table 5> 
 
Table 5 shows the percentages of large (top quintile), medium (third quintile), and small (bottom quintile) 
firms with dominant shareholders of different types. The proportion of widely held firms monotonically 
increases with size in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, the 
UK, and the USA, but monotonically decreases in Ireland, Israel, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Only in 13 of 24 countries are large firms more likely to be widely held than small firms. 
Proportion of family controlled firms monotonically decreases with size in Australia, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the USA. Only in Austria, Finland, Israel, 
and Portugal are large firms more likely to be controlled by a family than small firms. Proportion of firms 
controlled by an unlisted company monotonically increases with size in Austria, Finland, France, Japan, 
Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, and the UK, but monotonically decreases in 
Ireland, Italy and Sweden. In 17 of the 24 countries large firms are more likely to be controlled by an unlisted 
company than small firms. In the sample as a whole, and in twelve of the countries, listed companies are more 
(often much more) likely to be dominant owners of large firms than of small or medium firms. In all countries 
the government ownership is more prominent in large than in small companies; Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Portugal, and Singapore the state plays a very prominent role in the ownership of this group of firms. Except 
in New Zealand and Singapore, dominant ownership by institutional investors is concentrated on small and 
medium companies. Banks are dominant owners only in small and medium companies, except in Spain, where 
they are dominant owners of both small and large firms. Non-profit organizations, in contrast, tend to 
concentrate on large companies. In 16 countries direct and indirect ownership by families monotonically 
decreases with size, and in all countries except Italy families are more likely to directly or indirectly control 
small firms than large firms. 
 
PATTERNS OF OWNERSHIP AND TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
 
Is there a relationship between the patterns of ownership and the industry affiliation? In analyzing ownership 
patterns, we run individual-country maximum likelihood logit estimations of the type 
jk
j
jjjkjk IMCY    , 
where Yjk is the ownership indicator, MCjk is the log of stock market capitalization, and Ij are industry 
dummies; where the index k refers to the company, j the industry and i the country concerned. A full set of 
industry dummies is included. We also run pooled cross-country estimations of the equation 
jkii
j
jjijkijk CIMCY    , 
where Ci are country dummies; the dummy for Japan is not included. In order to avoid the excessive influence 
of countries with the large number of firms in the sample, the regressions we run on the whole sample are 
weighted, with weights inversely proportional to the percentage of firms in the sample (and scaled so that the 
resulting number of observations is the same). This procedure ensures that in estimating the regressions the 
number of observations per country effectively is equal. Both in the regressions with and without country 
dummies market capitalization is a significant predictor of the probability of having the controlling 
shareholder.  
 
     < Table 6>  
 
Table 6 reports the results for widely-held firms. The regressions confirm that larger firms are more likely to 
be widely held: for all but three countries the coefficient of the log of market capitalization (column heading 
‘size’) is positive, and for eleven countries it is significant at the 10 percent level. The whole-sample 
regressions indicate that firms in utilities are significantly less likely to be widely held than firms in all other 
industries, while firms in services are significantly more likely to be widely held than firms in all other 
industries except mining and construction, without significant differences among agriculture, mining and 
construction, manufacturing, and trade sector. In 13 of the 21 countries in which utilities industry is included 
in the estimations either there are no widely held firms in utilities industry, or the coefficient of the utilities 
dummy is the smallest among all coefficients; in three more countries it is the second smallest. On the other 
hand, in services the coefficient of dummies is among the two largest coefficients in twelve countries. 
However, it is among the two smallest coefficients only in four countries (among which are Japan and the 
USA). Mining and construction firms are significantly more likely to be widely held than firms in some other 
industries in four countries (counting the cases when no firms in a country in a given industry are widely 
held), but are significantly less likely to be widely held than firms in some other industries in five countries. 
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For manufacturing, the corresponding numbers are nine and seven countries; for utilities, two and nine; for 
trade sector, three and seven; and for services, six and four countries. 
 
      < Table 7> 
 
The results for direct control by families are reported in Table 7. In Portugal, all firms in the sample with 
market capitalization of $190mln or less (that is about a half of the number of firms in our sample) are family-
controlled, while firms above this size are not. In 12 of the other 23 countries larger firms are significantly 
more likely to be family-controlled. Firms in utilities are least likely to be family controlled, followed by 
mining and construction; in agriculture, manufacturing, trade sector and services family control is more 
prevalent, without significant differences among these four industries. In 18 of the 21 countries there are no 
firms in utilities that are family controlled, or the coefficient of the dummy is among the two smallest 
coefficients. The same is true for mining for 14 of the 19 countries.  
 
     < Table 8> 
 
Table 8 presents the results for direct control by unlisted companies. The whole-sample regressions do not 
include firms from Ireland where there are no firms controlled by an unlisted company. In all but two 
countries the size-coefficient is negative. Control by unlisted companies is most prevalent in utilities and trade 
sector, followed by manufacturing; mining and construction; and agriculture and services. The coefficient of 
the utility dummy is among the two largest coefficients in 15 of the 21 countries where it is included, and the 
coefficient of the trade sector dummy: in 13 of the 21 countries. In 16 of the 23 countries either there are no 
firms in services that are controlled by an unlisted company, or the coefficient of the dummy is among the two 
smallest coefficients. 
 
     < Table 9> 
 
There are too few firms of other types to conduct individual country regressions. The results of whole-sample 
regressions are presented in Table 9. Control by listed non-financial companies is more usual in larger firms, 
and is most prevalent in agriculture, followed by utilities. In foreign control regressions, many coefficients are 
significant at the level between 10 and 15 percent, so that it is difficult to detect a pattern. Firms in the trade 
sector have a foreign controlling shareholder least often, followed by manufacturing. In other industries we 
are about equally likely to encounter a foreign owner.  
Governments tend to be controlling shareholders of larger firms and are by far most important in 
utilities, and least important in trade, with little differences between other industries. Out of the 103 firms 
where the state is the dominant shareholder, 53 are in utilities. The only Danish firm where the state is the 
dominant shareholder is in this industry, as are the only British firm, the only Israeli firm and the only two 
Swedish firms. Still, in 16 countries the state is the dominant shareholder also in firms in other industries, in 
fact in all industry sectors. One firm is in agriculture (a Hong Kong based firm involved in raw wood 
production), two (in France and Korea) in construction, one company is a property developer listed in 
Australia but owned by the government of Singapore, and one (Australian pharmaceuticals producer and 
distributor) has the trade sector as the main industry. Ten firms are in service sector, six of which are in 
Singapore (including hotels, medical services, supply chain management, computer systems development).
5
 
Thirty-five firms are in manufacturing, including eight in Singapore, five in Finland, five in Korea and four in 
Hong Kong. The utilities firms owned by the state tend to be large, with 30 of the 53 firms in the top quintile 
of the total sample distribution, and all but seven firms in the top two quintiles. Firms in other industries also 
tend to be large, with 22 of the 50 firms in the top quintile of the total sample distribution, and 36 firms in the 
top two quintiles. 
Institutional investors are more likely to control smaller firms, and firms in manufacturing, and to 
some extent services. Almost three-quarters of the firms controlled by institutional investors come from 
Canada, the UK and the USA. The Canadian firms tend to be small (eight of the 13 are in the bottom two 
quintiles of the total sample distribution) and come disproportionately from mining and construction and 
construction (six of the 13 firms). The British firms tend not to be very large (only three firms in the top 
quintile of the total sample distribution) but otherwise evenly spread by size, and to come somewhat more 
often than on average in this country from manufacturing and somewhat less often from mining and 
construction and utilities. The US firms likewise tend not to be very large (only two firms in the top quintile 
of the total sample distribution, where in the whole sample the US firms are heavily overrepresented) but are 
                                                 
5 Services firms in other countries are a plant and housing development firm in Korea, a casinos firm in France, a hotel in Switzerland, and 
an infrastructure management firm in the Netherlands. 
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otherwise evenly spread by size. Their industry distribution is quite similar to the overall distribution of the 
US firms, but with utilities industry having a somewhat lower presence. Firms controlled by institutional 
investors in other countries are generally small (21 of the 30 firms are in the bottom two quintiles of the total 
sample distribution). These firms come more often from manufacturing and less often from utilities and 
services. 
Firms owned by banks are spread across industries.
6
 Only two firms belong to the high technology 
industries. The companies owned by banks tend to be small, with eight of the 22 firms in the bottom quintile 
of the total sample distribution, and only six firms in the top two quintiles.  
Non-profit organizations are dominant owners in eleven firms in Denmark, five in Sweden, and 
sixteen firms in ten other countries. The Danish firms come from every single industry (except agriculture) 
and are quite evenly spread by size. The Swedish firms are also of different sizes and come from different 
industries (construction, manufacturing, trade and services). Firms in other countries with a non-profit 
organization as a dominant owner tend to be relatively large: six of the 16 firms are in the top quintile of the 
total sample distribution. All but two of the 16 firms are in manufacturing.  
 
    < Table 10>  
 
Turning to the analysis of direct and indirect shareholders, as we can see in the last rows of Table 9, widely 
held firms are more important as dominant owners in larger companies and in utilities firms. Table 10 shows 
the results for firms directly or indirectly controlled by families. In all countries such control is more likely for 
smaller firms, in 17 of the 24 countries significantly so. In the sample as a whole, firms in the trade sector are 
more likely to be family controlled than firms in manufacturing and agriculture, which in turn are more likely 
to be family controlled than firms in other industries. In 16 of the 22 countries where the trade sector is 
included, either all firms in this sector are family controlled or the coefficient of the dummy is among the two 
largest coefficients For manufacturing, however, this is true only for 9 of the 24 countries.  
 
    < Table 11> 
 
In order to inquire whether the importance of different types of  owners differ between manufacturing 
industries, we run the whole-sample regression that in addition to the usual variables include dummies for 21 
manufacturing industries. Table 11 shows the coefficients of these dummies. It is not practical to test the 
equality of every single pair of coefficients. One would generally expect that either there is no difference in 
coefficients, or a certain number of smallest (largest) coefficients would differ significantly from the largest 
(smallest) coefficient, a smaller number of coefficients would differ from the second largest (smallest) 
coefficient and so on, with exceptions depending on the size of industries. The most interesting question is 
whether there is a difference in coefficients, in particular a difference not caused by one or two possible 
extreme coefficients. We choose first to compare the significance levels of coefficients equally distant from 
the extremes (the smallest and the largest coefficient, the second smallest and the second largest, etc.), and 
then test the equality of coefficients close to those of the first pair for which the coefficients are not 
significantly different. In this way we arrive at two groups of firms, one with the smallest coefficients of their 
dummies and one with the largest coefficients, the coefficients of members of which significantly differ from 
each other (at 10 percent level). In practice such groups in all cases comprise from 5 to 7 industries each. The 
likelihood of having a controlling shareholder of a certain type is thus statistically significantly higher in 
certain manufacturing industries than in others, and this is not caused by an extreme character of one or two 
industries. An alternative would be to test the difference from the largest and smallest coefficient (based on 
tests for two of the regressions, about half of coefficients differ significantly from the extreme coefficient) or 
from the median coefficient (two to four most extreme coefficients show significant differences in this case).  
It is interesting to look at high-technology industries: aircraft, computers, instruments, 
communication equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electrical machinery. As a rule most, but not all of 
these industries tend to be close to one of the ends of the range of industries for a given type of shareholder. 
Widely held firms are more prevalent in all these industries except aircraft than in any other industry except 
non-metal products. All industries except pharmaceuticals are among the nine industries where direct or 
indirect control by families is least present. Aircraft, chemicals, communication equipment and electrical 
machinery are less likely to be directly controlled by a family than any other industry except petroleum. 
Computing, communication equipment, and electrical machinery, are among the four industries where firms 
are least likely to be controlled by a foreign shareholder, with instruments at the eighth place. On the other 
                                                 
6  Three are in agriculture, one in mining and construction, three in utilities, one in trade, five in services, and eleven in manufacturing. The 
manufacturing firms belong to different sub-industries. Two firms are in the food sector.  
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hand aircraft is the industry which is most likely to have a dominant foreign owner. Electrical machinery, 
pharmaceuticals, computing, and communication equipment are among the nine industries where firms are 
least likely to be controlled by a listed non-financial firm.  
Among other industries, food has disproportionately many firms controlled by listed companies and 
few firms controlled by unlisted companies. Firms in clothing are not very likely to be controlled by listed (in 
particular, widely held) companies or by foreigners. Wood industry has few widely held firms, firms 
controlled by unlisted companies, and firms controlled by widely held companies, but relatively many firms 
with foreigners as dominant shareholders. Firms in paper industry are less often widely held or controlled by 
listed (in particular, widely held) companies than on average. Disproportionately many firms in printing 
industry are controlled by families, unlisted companies, and foreigners. Few of the printing firms are widely 
held. Firms in petroleum industry, other things equal, are less likely than firms in any other industry to be 
widely held or be controlled by unlisted companies, and less likely than firms in any other industry except 
aircraft to be directly controlled by families. Listed (in particular, widely held) companies and unlisted 
companies control a larger than average share of rubber and plastics firms. Basic metals industry is 
characterized by strong presence of widely held companies as controlling shareholders, and little role for 
foreign agents. 
Other types of shareholders control too few firms for the estimations of the type presented in Table 
11 to be feasible. Out of the 35 manufacturing firms controlled by a government, six firms (in Austria, 
Finland, Italy, Norway, Singapore, and Spain) are in petroleum industry, five (in Finland, Germany, Korea 
and Norway) – in primary metals, and four (in Korea, New Zealand and Singapore) – in shipbuilding. There 
are also state-owned firms in food, tobacco, paper, printing, chemicals, electrical machinery, communication 
equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and instrument industries. Firms controlled by institutional investors and 
banks are spread across different manufacturing industries. 
To summarize our findings, larger firms are more likely to be widely held and are more likely to be 
controlled by listed non-financial companies (in particular, widely held companies) and governments, whereas 
smaller firms are more likely to be have a family, an unlisted company, an institutional investors, or a bank as 
the dominant shareholder. Firms in manufacturing are less likely to be controlled by listed non-financial 
companies than firms in all other industries, less likely to have a foreigner as the dominant shareholder than 
firms in most other industries, but control by institutional investors is more prevalent in this industry than in 
most others. Firms in utilities are significantly less likely to be widely held and significantly less likely to be 
directly family-controlled than firms in other industries, but are more likely to be controlled by a government, 
a listed non-financial company (in particular, a widely held company), or by an unlisted company.  Firms in 
services are more likely to widely held, and less likely to be controlled by an unlisted company, than firms in 
most other industries. Control by governments and foreigners plays a smaller role in trade sector than in other 
industries, but control by unlisted companies is relatively prevalent. Firms in mining and construction are 
relatively rarely controlled by families. Firms in agriculture are more likely to be controlled by listed non-
financial companies and are never controlled by institutional investors and widely held non-financial 
companies. 
 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES 
 
A great advantage of our study is that it contains more information than most of the other studies. Our sample 
differs in sample coverage (in particular, exclusion of financial firms and lower size cut-off), the extent of 
identification of ultimate owners, and the definition of some categories (in particular, previous authors do not 
include a separate category for foreign owners and treat financial institutions somewhat differently from us). 
The differences with the studies by Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claesens et al. (2000) are presented in Table 
12.  
 
< Table 12> 
 
For European countries our figures for direct and indirect ownership generally are quite similar to those 
reported by Faccio and Lang regarding ownership by state and by widely held corporations, and also for the 
percentage of widely held and family-controlled firms for Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the 
UK. We identify somewhat lower percentage of widely held firms in Portugal, somewhat higher percentage of 
widely held firms in Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Switzerland and especially Spain. In our sample, 
there are less family-controlled firms than in the Faccio-Lang sample in Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
and Switzerland. These differences may stem from exclusion of smaller firms from our sample, which are less 
likely to be widely held and more likely to be family-controlled, and/or from evolution of ownership patterns, 
with more firms becoming widely held. Claessens et al. report figures generally similar to ours for Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Singapore. We find a somewhat lower incidence of family control in Korea and a higher 
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percentage of widely held firms in Singapore. The results for Japan, however, differ considerably. Claessens 
et al. report that 80 percent of Japanese firms in their sample are widely held, 10 percent are family controlled, 
3 percent are controlled by widely held non-financial companies, and 6.5 percent by widely held financial 
institutions. The corresponding figures in our analysis are 61, 20, 16, and 0.2 percent (for banks and 
institutional investors). These differences may stem, in particular, from the inclusion of financial firms in the 
sample of Claessens et al. 
 
    < Table 13> 
 
Table 13 reports the figures for the 20 largest firms in our sample. Comparing them with the findings of La 
Porta et al. (1999), we observe that the figures often do not differ significantly from each other. The major 
difference is the much lower incidence of state-controlled firms in our sample, especially in Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Israel, New Zealand, and Portugal, and to a lesser extent in Finland and Italy, which is likely to be 
related to the evolution of ownership patterns. In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand we find a much lower 
incidence of control by widely held companies (although these controlling companies in the sample of La 
Porta et al. may be foreign; we find some incidence of foreign control in our sample). We find a significantly 
higher percentage of widely held firms in Finland, Germany and the Netherlands than La Porta and his 
colleagues, and much higher incidence of family control in Italy and Potugal. The correlation coefficient 
between the two samples of the percentage of widely held firms is 0.91, of the percentage of family-controlled 
firms is 0.75, and of the percentage of state-controlled firms is 0.75. 
 
     < Table 14>  
 
Table 14 reports the figures for the 10 ‘medium-size’ firms in our sample, selected in the same way as is done 
by La Porta et al. The comparison with the figures reported by La Porta et al. suggests that the two sets of 
figures generally exhibit similar patterns. Again, the most striking difference is a much smaller incidence of 
government control in our sample, in particular in France, Germany, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
especially Austria, where 83 percent of the firms were state controlled, as opposed to none in our sample. It is 
not surprising that in these countries we find a higher incidence of either widely held firms (in Austria, 
France, Israel, Spain, Sweden) or family-controlled firms (in France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain). Other 
main differences are a comparatively greater prominence in our sample of widely held firms and a smaller role 
of family-controlled firms in Hong Kong and Korea, a greater importance of family-controlled firms in 
Belgium, and a larger role of family-controlled firms compared to widely held firms in the USA (in the 
sample of La Porta et al. nine of the ten firms were widely held and one was family controlled, while in our 
sample this holds for correspondingly six and four firms). The correlation coefficients this time are somewhat 
lower, between 0.49 and 0.67.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has investigated the identity of ownership of slightly less than 7000 firms in 24 industrial 
countries. Attention as been paid to the size of the firms, the industry it belongs to, and the country concerned. 
Almost 50 percent of the firms are widely held. Families and unlisted companies are the owners of 19 
respectively 17 percent of the companies. In all countries banks and institutional investors hold only small 
percentage of the companies. Except for Denmark, the same holds for non-profit organizations. Listed non-
financial firms, foreigners and the government constitute the medium group. The differences between the 
countries can be quite substantial.  
The logit regressions reveal that larger firms are more likely to be widely held and are more likely to 
be controlled by listed non-financial companies and governments, whereas smaller firms are more likely to 
have a family, an unlisted company, an institutional investor, or a bank as the dominant shareholder. Firms in 
manufacturing are less likely to be controlled by listed non-financial companies than firms in all other 
industries, but control by institutional investors is more prevalent in this industry than in most others. Firms in 
utilities are more likely to be controlled by a government or a non-financial company (both listed and 
unlisted). Firms in services are more likely to widely held. In the trade sector control by unlisted companies is 
relatively prevalent. Firms in mining and construction are relatively rarely controlled by families. Firms in 
agriculture are more likely to be controlled by listed non-financial companies and are never controlled by 
institutional investors and widely held non-financial companies.  
  We consider these results as a good basis for future research, which should go more deeply in the 
explanatory factors and the consequences of the ownership structures found.  
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Table 1 
Direct control of publicly held firms: numbers of firms 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 Held Family Listed non- Foreign Govern- Institutional Bank Non-profit Unlisted 
   financial  ment investor   company 
Australia 236 85 16 19 3 3 0 0 50 
Austria 9 10 1 4 6 0 0 0 13 
Belgium 9 20 4 7 2 0 0 2 22 
Canada 367 75 6 18 0 13 0 1 85 
Denmark 20 5 4 6 1 4 0 11 13 
Finland 38 12 5 4 6 1 0 2 17 
France 73 132.5 21 16 6 1 0 1 144.5 
Germany 82 93 24 33.5 6 3 0.5 3 88 
Hong Kong 36 137.5 31 51 6 1 0 0 128.5 
Ireland 28 4 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel 28 11 19 1 1 1 0 1 21 
Italy 18 72 7 11 14 0 1 0 46 
Japan 535 69 156.5 11 1 1 1 0.5 100 
Korea 135 47.66 26 8 9 3 5 2 46.33 
Netherlands 68 5 3 11 2 2 0 0 22 
New Zealand 21 15 0 9 4 0 0 0 12 
Norway 32 9 6 1 5 3 1 1 26 
Portugal 4 1 6 1 0 1 0 0 19 
Singapore 43 91 2 17 21 1 7 0 56 
Spain 39 16 12 3 2 0 4 0 15 
Sweden 51 42 11 4 2 0 0 5 37 
Switzerland 57 38 5 12 5 3 3 1 16 
United Kingdom 558 126 5 18 1 43 0 0 46 
United States 834 182.66 9 11 0 27.5 0 1 90.83 
Sample 3321 1299.32 380.5 280.5 103 112.5 22.5 32.5 1114.16 
 
The figures are not always whole numbers since some companies have two or three dominant shareholders of different types. These shareholders were assigned 
the weights of 0.5 (respectively 0.33) in calculating the numbers in the table. 
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Table 2 
Direct control of publicly held firms: percentages of firms in a country 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 Held Family Listed non- Foreign Govern- Institutional Bank Non-profit Unlisted 
   financial  ment investor   company 
Australia 57 21 4 5 1 1 0 0 12 
Austria 21 23 2 9 14 0 0 0 30 
Belgium 14 30 6 11 3 0 0 3 33 
Canada 65 13 1 3 0 2 0 0 15 
Denmark 31 8 6 9 2 6 0 17 20 
Finland 45 14 6 5 7 1 0 2 20 
France 18 33 5 4 2 0 0 1 36 
Germany 25 28 7 10 2 1 0 1 26 
Hong Kong 9 35 8 13 2 0 0 0 33 
Ireland 74 11 3 11 0 3 0 0 0 
Israel 34 13 23 1 1 1 0 1 25 
Italy 11 43 4 7 8 0 1 0 27 
Japan 61 8 18 1 0.1 0 0 0 11 
Korea 48 17 9 3 3 1 2 1 16 
Netherlands 60 4 3 10 2 2 0 0 19 
New Zealand 34 25 0 15 7 0 0 0 20 
Norway 38 11 7 1 6 4 1 1 31 
Portugal 13 3 19 3 0 3 0 0 59 
Singapore 18 38 1 7 9 0 3 0 24 
Spain 43 18 13 3 2 0 4 0 16 
Sweden 34 28 7 3 1 0 0 3 24 
Switzerland 41 27 4 9 4 2 2 1 11 
United Kingdom 70 16 1 2 0.1 5 0 0 6 
United States 72 16 1 1 0 2 0 0.1 8 
Sample 49.8 19 6 4 2 2 0 0 17 
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Table 3 
Direct and indirect control of publicly held firms: numbers of firms 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 Held Family Widely held  Foreign Govern- Institutional Bank Non-profit 
   non-financial  ment investor   
Australia 236 137 13 19 4 3 0 0 
Austria 9 23 1 4 6 0 0 0 
Belgium 9 44 2 7 2 0 0 2 
Canada 367 162 4 18 0 13 0 1 
Denmark 20 19 2 7 1 4 0 11 
Finland 38 29 3 6 6 1 0 2 
France 73 282 11 19 8 1 0 2 
Germany 82 189 9 37.5 9 3 0.5 3 
Hong Kong 36 291 6 51 6 1 0 0 
Ireland 28 4 1 4 0 1 0 0 
Israel 28 45 7 1 1 1 0 1 
Italy 18 118 4 11 16 0 1 0 
Japan 535 173.5 139 15 3 1 1 0.5 
Korea 135 100 18 10 9 3 5 2 
Netherlands 68 27 2 12 2 2 0 0 
New Zealand 21 27 0 9 4 0 0 0 
Norway 32 38 2 1 6 3 1 1 
Portugal 4 25 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Singapore 43 147 1 17 22 1 7 0 
Spain 39 34 6 5 2 0 5 0 
Sweden 51 83 2 5 2 2 0 7 
Switzerland 57 55 2 14 5 3 3 1 
United Kingdom 558 174 0 20 1 43 0 0 
United States 834 274.5 4 15 0 27.5 0 1 
Sample 3321 2501 240 308.5 115 114.5 23.5 34.5 
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Table 4 
Direct and indirect control of publicly held firms: percentages of firms in a country 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 Held Family Widely held  Foreign Govern- Institutional Bank Non-profit 
   non-financial  ment investor   
Australia 57 33 3 5 1 1 0 0 
Austria 21 53 2 9 14 0 0 0 
Belgium 14 67 3 11 3 0 0 3 
Canada 65 29 1 3 0 2 0 0.2 
Denmark 31 30 3 11 2 6 0 17 
Finland 45 34 4 7 7 1 0 2 
France 18 71 3 5 2 0.3 0 1 
Germany 25 57 3 11 3 1 0.2 1 
Hong Kong 9 74 2 13 2 0.3 0 0 
Ireland 74 11 3 11 0 3 0 0 
Israel 33 54 8 1 1 1 0 1 
Italy 11 70 2 7 10 0 1 0 
Japan 62 20 16 2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Korea 48 35 6 4 3 1 2 1 
Netherlands 60 24 2 11 2 2 0 0 
New Zealand 34 44 0 15 7 0 0 0 
Norway 38 45 2 1 7 4 1 1 
Portugal 13 78 3 3 0 3 0 0 
Singapore 18 62 0.4 7 9 0.4 3 0 
Spain 43 37 7 5 2 0 5 0 
Sweden 34 55 1 3 1 1 0 5 
Switzerland 41 39 1 10 4 2 2 1 
United Kingdom 70 22 0 3 0.1 5 0 0 
United States 72 24 0.3 1 0 2 0 0.1 
Sample 50 38 4 5 2 2 0.4 1 
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Table 5 
Direct control of publicly held firms and firm size: percentage of firms in country and group 
 
  Widely Dominant shareholder 
  
held 
Direct ownership Direct and indirect 
ownership 
   
Family 
Listed 
non- Foreign Govern- 
Institu-
tional Bank Non- Unlisted 
 
Family 
Widely 
held 
    financial  Ment investor  profit comp.  non-fin. 
Australia Small 56 27 4 0 0 0 0 0 12 56 4 
 Medium 57 20 1 4 0 1 0 0 17 57 1 
 Large 78 6 3 8 3 0 0 0 3 78 0 
Austria Small 29 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 29 0 
 Medium 20 40 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 20 0 
 Large 22 33 11 11 22 0 0 0 0 22 0 
Belgium Small 23 31 0 15 0 0 0 0 31 23 0 
 Medium 0 38 6 13 0 0 0 0 44 0 6 
 Large 67 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 
Canada Small 50 16 0 3 0 6 0 0 26 50 0 
 Medium 64 13 1 5 0 2 0 1 15 64 1 
 Large 66 13 1 5 0 2 0 0 13 66 1 
Denmark Small 36 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 27 36 0 
 Medium 22 11 6 11 0 0 0 22 28 22 0 
 16 
 Large 50 0 0 0 25 0 0 25 0 50 0 
Finland Small 31 25 13 0 0 0 0 0 31 31 6 
 Medium 48 10 5 5 0 5 0 5 24 48 5 
 Large 33 33 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 33 0 
France Small 6 43 0 1 0 0 0 0 49 6 0 
 Medium 13 41 1 6 0 0 0 0 39 13 0 
 Large 40 19 14 6 6 0 0 3 13 40 10 
Germany Small 24 42 7 7 0 1 1 0 18 24 6 
 Medium 17 27 3 14 0 0 0 0 39 17 2 
 Large 34 10 14 8 5 2 0 2 25 34 7 
Hong  Small 8 42 8 14 1 1 0 0 27 8 2 
Kong Medium 9 36 9 13 0 0 0 0 33 9 1 
 Large 14 25 7 21 7 0 0 0 25 14 0 
Ireland Small 71 14 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 71 0 
 Medium 57 0 0 43 0 0 0 0 0 57 0 
 Large 33 0 33 0 11 0 0 0 22 33 11 
Israel Small 41 12 18 0 0 0 0 0 29 41 6 
 Medium 27 14 32 0 0 5 0 0 23 27 14 
 Large 11 33 11 0 11 0 0 0 33 11 11 
Italy Small 22 48 0 11 4 0 0 0 15 22 0 
 Medium 3 51 5 5 5 0 0 0 30 3 3 
 Large 8 25 13 4 17 0 0 0 33 8 4 
Japan Small 53 15 17 0 0 1 1 0 13 53 17 
 17 
 Medium 60 6 22 0.5 0 0 0 0.2 11 60 20 
 Large 70 2 16 4 1 0 0 0 9 70 13 
Korea Small 41 23 6 2 1 2 4 0 20 41 6 
 Medium 55 17 13 0 0 0 0 0 16 55 9 
 Large 63 0 19 6 6 0 0 0 6 63 19 
Nether- Small 38 8 0 8 0 15 0 0 31 38 0 
lands Medium 48 5 5 10 5 0 0 0 29 48 5 
 Large 71 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 12 71 0 
New  Small 50 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 50 0 
Zealand Medium 27 33 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 27 0 
 Large 43 14 0 0 0 14 0 14 14 43 0 
Norway Small 19 19 0 6 0 6 0 0 50 19 0 
 Medium 62 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 24 62 0 
 Large 0 0 25 0 13 0 0 0 63 0 13 
Portugal Small 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 33 0 
 Medium 25 0 13 0 0 13 0 0 50 25 0 
 Large 22 11 0 11 44 0 0 0 11 22 0 
Singa- Small 23 35 0 7 4 0 2 0 29 23 0 
Pore Medium 10 43 3 10 5 0 8 0 23 10 3 
 Large 25 6 0 6 44 6 0 0 13 25 0 
Spain Small 50 33 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 50 0 
 Medium 31 46 0 4 0 0 0 0 19 31 0 
 Large 40 15 15 5 5 0 10 0 10 40 15 
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Sweden Small 38 38 6 0 0 0 0 0 19 38 3 
 Medium 32 44 0 4 0 0 0 0 20 32 0 
 Large 20 7 27 7 7 0 0 7 27 20 7 
Switzer- Small 58 25 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 58 0 
land Medium 36 32 4 8 0 8 4 0 8 36 4 
 Large 48 16 8 4 8 0 0 4 12 48 8 
United  Small 54 28 0 3 0 5 0 0 10 54 0 
Kingdom Medium 58 25 8 0 0 4 0 0 4 58 8 
 Large 86 6 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 86 1 
United  Small 56 30 1 0 0 3 0 0 11 56 1 
States Medium 66 16 1 1 0 4 0 0.5 11 66 1 
 Large 87 6 1 2 0 1 0 0 4 87 1 
Sample Small 39 28 5 4 0.5 2 1 0.1 21 39 4 
 Medium 48 19 6 5 0.4 2 0.4 1 17 48 5 
 Large 63 9 7 4 4 1 0.2 1 11 63 4 
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Table 6 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry affiliation: estimations for widely held firms 
 
 Size Mining Manufac-
turing 
Utilities Trade Services Agricul-
ture 
Australia 0.130
*
 -0.239 -0.409 -0.626 -0.397 -0.282  
Austria 0.730
*
 NI -6.143
s 
-7.260
s 
NI -3.172
cm
  
Belgium 0.059 -1.910 -3.850
st 
NI -0.929
m 
-0.970
m 
 
Canada 0.130
**
 0.167
tu 
-0.070
t 
-0.484
c 
-0.671
cm
 -0.298  
Denmark 0.008 NI -1.434
s 
-0.744 -0.733
 
-0.040
m
  
Finland 0.055 NI -0.654
s 
-0.054 0.603 -0.870  
France 0.439
***
 -4.505 -4.334 -4.443 -4.620
s 
-3.718
mt
  
Germany 0.180
**
 -2.131 -2.069 -2.547 -2.483 -2.078  
Hong Kong 0.337
***
 -4.692 -3.756
u 
-5.387
m
 -4.108 -4.150  
Ireland 0.209 0.774 -0.311 NI 0.781 -0.882  
Israel 0.107 No -1.251
s 
No -2.795
s 
0.040
mt
  
Italy -0.224 No -0.504 -1.554 No -0.817  
Japan 0.142
***
 -0.363
s 
0.044
st 
-0.306 -0.682
m
 -0.981
cm
  
Korea 0.160
*
 -0.578 -0.977 -0.966 -0.671 -0.598  
Netherlands 0.343
**
 -0.889
t 
-1.382
t 
-2.355 -2.636
cm
 -1.700  
New Zealand 0.280 NI -1.926 -2.528 -2.481 -1.922  
Norway -0.104 0.810
u
 0.242 -0.656
c
 0.489 0.023  
Portugal -1.206 4.693 No NI NI 5.200  
Singapore 0.027 -2.412 -1.516 -1.533 -2.181 -1.469  
Spain 0.107 -2.181
m 
-0.446
cu
 -1.671
m
 -0.617 -1.397  
Sweden -0.078 -0.533 -0.470
t 
-1.731
t 
0.539
mu
 -0.051  
Switzerland 0.134 NI -0.972
 u
 -2.439
 m
 -1.820 -1.134  
United 
Kingdom 
0.381
***
 -0.774
tu 
-1.039
 tu 
-1.702
cms 
-1.518
 cm
 -1.194
u 
 
United States 0.316
***
 -0.668 -0.840
s 
-0.645
s 
-0.991 -1.109
mu
  
Sample 0.139
***
 -0.192
u 
-0.307
su 
-0.749
cmst 
-0.361
su 
-0.046
amtu 
0.570
s 
 
‘NI’ indicates that there are less than five firms in this industry in this country. The firms in this industry are 
thus not included in the estimation. 
 
‘No’ indicates that there are no firms in this industry in this country that belong to this ownership category. The 
firms in this industry are thus not included in the estimation. 
 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The 
significance levels are not reported for industry dummies since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the 
analysis 
 
The superscript letters indicate that the coefficient of this industry dummy is different from the coefficient of the 
industry dummy indicated by the letter at 10 percent level. 
a – agriculture    s - services 
c – mining and construction  t – trade sector 
m – manufacturing   u - utilities 
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Table 7 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry affiliation: estimations for directly family controlled firms 
 
 Size Mining Manufac-
turing 
Utilities Trade Services Agricul-
ture 
Australia -0.345
***
 -0.411
mst 
0.530
c 
0.112
 
0.389
c 
0.719
c 
 
Austria -0.819
**
 NI 3.756 3.186 NI No  
Belgium 0.129 -2.278 -1.356 NI -2.056 -0.605  
Canada -0.101 -1.934
mst 
-1.164
c
 -1.344
 
-0.772
c 
-0.761
c 
 
Denmark -0.268 NI -0.494 -0.807 -1.112 No  
Finland -0.200 NI -0.838 No -0.692 -0.606  
France -0.286
***
 0.267 0.734
t 
0.722 1.371
m
 1.037  
Germany -0.359
***
 1.489
u 
1.031
u 
-0.604
cmst
 1.204
u 
1.060
u 
 
Hong Kong -0.141
*
 -0.160 0.299
u 
-0.546
m 
0.086 -0.027  
Ireland -0.131 No -0.692 NI No -0.565  
Israel -0.345 0.311 0.173 No 1.040
s 
-1.423
t 
 
Italy -0.130 0.459 0.704
u 
-0.906
mst 
1.277
u 
0.973
u 
 
Japan -0.500
***
 -0.461
s 
-0.599
st 
0.172 0.387
ms 
1.068
cmt 
 
Korea -0.508
***
 1.189 0.903 -0.708
t 
1.463
su 
-0.551
t 
 
Netherlands -0.476 No -0.054 No -0.012 -0.707  
New Zealand -0.400 NI 0.890 0.383 1.561 1.456  
Norway 0.078 -2.520 -3.055 -2.279 No -2.076  
Portugal All small No No NI NI   
Singapore -0.383
***
 1.378 1.576
su 
0.605
m 
1.510 0.961
m 
 
Spain -0.262 -0.384 -0.117 -0.784 0.797 1.001  
Sweden -0.316
**
 0.796 1.021 No 1.045 0.419  
Switzerland -0.298
**
 NI 1.023 -0.128 0.723 0.542  
United 
Kingdom 
-0.502
***
 0.672
t 
0.664
tu 
1.421
m 
1.442
cms 
0.937
t 
 
United States -0.355
***
 0.241 0.227
s 
0.168 0.600 0.576
m 
 
Sample -0.248
***
 -1.699
amst
 -1.098
cu 
-1.892
amst 
-1.025
cu 
-1.159
cu 
-1.133
cu 
 
‘NI’ indicates that there are less than five firms in this industry in this country. The firms in this industry are 
thus not included in the estimation. 
 
‘No’ indicates that there are no firms in this industry in this country that belong to this ownership category. The 
firms in this industry are thus not included in the estimation. 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The 
significance levels are not reported for industry dummies since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the 
analysis 
 
The superscript letters indicate that the coefficient of this industry dummy is different from the coefficient of the 
industry dummy indicated by the letter at 10 percent level. 
a – agriculture    s - services 
c – mining and construction  t – trade sector 
m – manufacturing   u - utilities 
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Table 8 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry a1ffiliation: estimations for firms controlled by unlisted 
companies 
 
 Size Mining Manufac-
turing 
Utilities Trade Services Agricul-
ture 
Australia -0.259
**
 -0.715 -0.792 -0.168 -0.440 -0.873  
Austria -0.187 NI -0.021 No NI -0.187  
Belgium -0.447
**
 0.479 1.976 NI 1.922 No  
Canada -0.175
**
 -0.844 -0.953
t 
-0.350 -0.222
m 
-0.972  
Denmark 0.118 NI -1.855 -2.367 -1.273 -3.151  
Finland -0.425
*
 NI 1.149 0.790 No 1.099  
France -0.259
***
 -0.383
mt 
1.207
cs 
0.728 1.082
c 
0.538
m 
 
Germany -0.070 -0.118 -0.477
s 
-0.376 -0.419 -1.145
m 
 
Hong Kong -0.083 -0.177 -0.430 0.082 -0.030 -0.461  
Ireland No such firms      
Israel -0.153 1.235
ms 
-0.648
cu 
1.609
ms 
-0.0003 -1.107
cu 
 
Italy 0.044 -1.169 -1.454 -0.798 -0.767 -1.450  
Japan -0.138
*
 -1.427 -1.820
st 
-1.434 -0.684
m 
-0.934
m 
 
Korea -0.356
**
 -0.328
u 
-0.076
u 
1.222
cmt 
-0.139
u 
0.639  
Netherlands -0.286
*
 -0.296 0.018 1.088 0.712 0.330  
New Zealand -0.320 NI -0.357 0.429 0.800 -0.396  
Norway -0.591
**
 2.004 2.359 3.009
u 
2.240 1.023
u 
 
Portugal 0.308 -0.134 -0.741 NI NI -2.226  
Singapore -0.089 -0.195 -1.019
t 
-0.906 -0.343
m 
-0.697  
Spain -0.119 0.457
ms 
-1.118
c 
-0.344 No -1.631
c 
 
Sweden 0.005 -1.011 -1.033
t 
-0.438 -3.026
ms 
-1.093
t 
 
Switzerland 0.109 NI -3.130
t 
-2.747 -1.687
m 
-2.474  
United 
Kingdom 
-0.102 -3.029 -2.206 -2.115 -2.056 -2.096  
United States -0.196
***
 -1.567 -1.368 -1.721 -1.447 -1.000  
Sample -0.155
***
 -1.058
as 
-1.245
astu 
-1.063
ams 
-0.989
ams 
-1.637
cmtu 
-1.847
cmtu 
 
‘NI’ indicates that there are less than five firms in this industry in this country. The firms in this industry are 
thus not included in the estimation. 
 
‘No’ indicates that there are no firms in this industry in this country that belong to this ownership category. The 
firms in this industry are thus not included in the estimation. 
 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The 
significance levels are not reported for industry dummies since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the 
analysis 
 
The superscript letters indicate that the coefficient of this industry dummy is different from the coefficient of the 
industry dummy indicated by the letter at 10 percent level. 
a – agriculture    s - services 
c – mining and construction  t – trade sector 
m – manufacturing   u - utilities 
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Table 9 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry affiliation 
 
Dominant 
shareholder 
Size Mining Manufac-
turing 
Utilities Trade Services Agricul-ture 
Listed 0.189
***
 -2.470
 amu
 -2.827
astu 
-2.046
acmst 
-2.424
amu 
-2.436
 amu
 -1.326
cmstu 
Foreign 0.034 -4.100
t 
-4.408
u 
-4.042
mt 
-4.677
csu 
-4.196
tu 
-4.211 
Government 0.521
***
 -10.304
tu 
-10.273
tu 
-8.386
acmst 
-13.415
acmsu 
-10.465
tu 
-10.617
tu 
Institutional 
investor 
-0.300
***
 -6.084
m 
-4.808
cstu 
-6.683
ms 
-6.084
m 
-5.462
mu 
No 
Direct and 
indirect 
ownership 
       
Widely held 
firms as 
dominant 
shareholders 
0.180
***
 -2.410 -2.773
u 
-2.003
mst 
-2.817
u 
-2.465
u 
No 
 
‘No’ indicates that there are no firms in this industry that belong to this ownership category. The firms in this 
industry are thus not included in the estimation. 
 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The 
significance levels are not reported for industry dummies since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the 
analysis 
 
The superscript letters indicate that the coefficient of this industry dummy is different from the coefficient of the 
industry dummy indicated by the letter at 10 percent level. 
a – agriculture 
c – mining and construction 
m – manufacturing 
s – services 
t – trade sector 
u – utilities 
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Table 10 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry affiliation: estimations for firms directly or indirectly 
controlled by families 
 
 Size Mining Manufac-
turing 
Utilities Trade Services Agricul-
ture 
Australia -0.345
***
 0.546
ms 
1.089
c 
1.135 1.159 1.222
c 
 
Austria -0.928
**
 NI 6.300
su 
3.774
m 
NI 3.377
m 
 
Belgium -0.196 0.278
m 
2.151
c 
NI 1.738 1.621  
Canada -0.161
**
 -0.386
stu 
-0.021
t 
0.308
c 
0.667
cm 
0.221
c 
 
Denmark -0.0003 NI -0.574
s 
-1.097 0.001
s 
-2.564
mt 
 
Finland -0.403
**
 NI 1.672 0.658 0.362 1.784  
France -0.553
***
 2.527
mstu 
4.418
ct 
4.006
ct 
5.220
cmsu 
3.893
ct 
 
Germany -0.296
***
 2.814 2.120
su 
1.342
mt 
2.306
u 
1.615
m 
 
Hong Kong -0.239
***
 2.143 2.201 2.589 2.422 2.414  
Ireland -0.131 No -0.692 NI No -0.564  
Israel -0.204 All 1.020
t 
1.908
s 
3.341
ms 
0.219
tu 
 
Italy -0.094 1.465 1.496
u 
0.778
ms 
All 1.902
u 
 
Japan -0.289
***
 -0.086
st 
-0.502
st 
0.072
s 
0.706
cm 
0.958
cmu 
 
Korea -0.409
***
 1.397 1.405 1.671 1.630 0.890  
Netherlands -0.359
**
 0.118 0.850 1.573 1.467 0.937  
New Zealand -0.529
**
 NI 2.132
t 
2.348 3.548
m 
2.632  
Norway -0.446
**
 2.279 1.957
u 
3.052
ms 
2.089 1.278
u 
 
Portugal 0.896 -3.182 -2.375 NI NI -4.437  
Singapore -0.413
***
 3.215 2.539 1.796
t 
3.084
su 
2.174
t 
 
Spain -0.256 2.302
m 
0.801
c 
1.066 0.766 1.674  
Sweden -0.204
*
 1.361 1.605
t 
1.659 0.655
m 
1.117  
Switzerland -0.191
*
 NI 0.742 0.056
t 
1.427
u 
0.612  
United 
Kingdom 
-0.403
***
 0.397
tu 
0.658
tu 
1.257
cm 
1.345
cms 
0.892
t 
 
United States -0.330
***
 0.561 0.629
s 
0.449
s 
0.879
 
1.051
mu 
 
Sample -0.271
***
 -0.198
mt 
0.026
cstu 
-0.245
mt 
0.386
cmsu 
-0.292
mt 
0.085 
 
‘NI’ indicates that there are less than five firms in this industry in this country. The firms in this industry are 
thus not included in the estimation. 
‘No’ indicates that there are no firms in this industry in this country that belong to this ownership category. The 
firms in this industry are thus not included in the estimation. 
 
*, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The 
significance levels are not reported for industry dummies since they are irrelevant for the purposes of the 
analysis 
 
The superscript letters indicate that the coefficient of this industry dummy is different from the coefficient of the 
industry dummy indicated by the letter at 10 percent level. 
a – agriculture    s - services 
c – mining and construction  t – trade sector 
m – manufacturing   u - utilities 
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Table 11 
Ownership patterns, firm size and industry affiliation: manufacturing industries 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 
held 
Direct ownership Direct and indirect 
ownership 
  
Family 
Listed 
non- Foreign Unlisted 
 
Family 
Widely 
held 
   Financial  comp.  non-fin. 
Size 0.155
***
 -0.246
***
 0.201
***
 0.011 -0.155
***
 -0.266
***
 0.188
***
 
Food -0.583 -1.174
 
-4.382
a 
-4.329 -0.739
b 
0.343
b 
-4.308
a 
Textiles -0.569 -0.420
 b
 -2.640 -6.392
a 
-1.427 0.662
 b
 No 
Clothing -0.468 -0.861
 a
 -4.915
 a
 -4.760 -1.078 0.392
 b
 No 
Wood  -0.848
a 
-1.046 -2.024
 b
 -2.794
b 
-1.541 0.110 No 
Paper  -0.904
 a
 -1.293 -4.031
 a
 -3.744
 b
 -0.950
 b
 -0.023 -3.116 
Printing -1.258
 a
 -0.343
b 
-3.751 -3.689
 b
 -1.030
 b
 0.756
 b
 -3.184 
Chemicals 
excluding drugs 
-0.236
b 
-1.748
 a
 -2.413
b 
-4.135 -1.499 -0.559
a 
-2.269 
Drugs  -0.258 -1.081 -3.895
 a
 -4.122 -0.823
 b
 0.288 -3.900
 a
 
Petroleum -1.281
 a
 -2.126
 a
 -4.226
 a
 -2.789
 b
 -2.544
a 
-1.449
 a
 -3.806 
Rubber & Plastic  -0.761
 a
 -1.108 -1.896
 b
 -4.296 -0.828
 b
 0.350
 b
 -1.548
b 
Leather -0.347 -0.677
 b
 -2.008
 b
 -4.172 -2.018
 a
 -0.019 -1.741
 b
 
Non-Metallic 
Products 
-0.136
 b
 -1.149 -2.180
 b
 -4.755 -1.631
 a
 -0.037 -3.320 
Basic Metal  -0.570 -1.385 -2.386
 b
 -5.134
 a
 -1.172 -0.172 -1.965
 b
 
Metal Products -0.308 -0.884 -3.404 -4.414 -1.175 0.252 -3.546 
Machinery & 
Equipment, nec 
-0.470 -0.980 -2.351
 b
 -4.106 -1.374 0.042 -1.965
 b
 
Computing  0.243
 b
 -0.646
 b
 -4.234
 a
 -4.861
 a
 -1.850
 a
 -0.186 -3.916
 a
 
Electrical 
Machinery 
-0.054
 b
 -1.399
 a
 -3.935
 a
 -4.818
 a
 -1.099 -0.101 -4.056
 a
 
Communication 
Equipment 
0.082
 b
 -1.426
 a
 -3.534 -4.987
 a
 -1.163 -0.267
 a
 -3.197 
Aircraft -0.499 -2.273
a 
-2.570 -2.374
 b
 -1.602 -1.083
 a
 -3.683 
Transport 
Equipment 
-0.688
 a
 -0.809
 b
 -2.512 -4.516 -2.081
 a
 -0.310
 a
 -2.520 
Instruments 0.038
 b
 -1.120 -2.585 -4.733 -1.930
 a
 -0.439
 a
 -2.264 
Other 
Manufacturing 
-0.324 -1.177 -2.866 -4.632 -0.934
 b
 0.301
 b
 -3.053 
 
Superscript ‘a’ indicates that the industry belongs to the group of industries with smallest coefficients of their 
dummies, which all differ significantly from the coefficients of the group with the largest coefficients. 
 
Superscript ‘b’ indicates that the industry belongs to the group of industries with largest coefficients of their 
dummies, which all differ significantly from the coefficients of the group with the snallest coefficients. 
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Table 12 
Control of publicly held firms: Comparison with other studies percentages of firms in a country 
 
 
   
All figures in the table present the percentage of firms controlled by different 
controlling owners at the 20% threshold. The figures from the present study and 
those from Faccio and Lang (2002) refer to non-financial firms (their Table 4), 
whereas the data from Claessens et al. (2000), Table 6 refer to all firms: financial and 
non-financial. 
 Widely                
held 
Widely 
held   
Widely 
held Family  
Family               Family  
  Faccio and 
Lang 
Claessens 
et al.   
Faccio and 
Lang 
Claessens     et 
al.  
Australia 57   33   
Austria 21 12  53 59  
Belgium 14 9  67 64  
Canada 65   29   
Denmark 31   30   
Finland 45 32  34 44  
France 18 12  71 71  
Germany 25 10  57 69  
Hong Kong 9  7 74  67 
Ireland 74 62  11 27  
Israel 34   54   
Italy 11 9  70 72  
Japan 61  80 20  10 
Korea 48  43 35  48 
Netherlands 60   24   
New Zealand 34   44   
Norway 38 33  45 44  
Portugal 13 23  78 55  
Singapore 18  5 62  55 
Spain 43 26  37 62  
Sweden 34 37  55 47  
Switzerland 41 26  39 56  
United Kingdom 70 64  22 25  
United States 72   24   
 26 
Table 13    
Direct and indirect control of publicly held firms: numbers of firms among the 20 largest firms 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 
held Family 
Widely held 
non- Foreign Govern- 
Institutional 
investor Non-profit 
   financial  ment or bank  
Australia 15 2 0 2 1 0 0 
Austria 5 7 0 2 6 0 0 
Belgium 3 11 1 2 2 0 1 
Canada 14 3 0 3 0 0 0 
Denmark 6 5 1 2 1 1 4 
Finland 11 3 1 0 4 0 1 
France 13 3 2 0 2 0 0 
Germany 14 1 1 1 3 0 0 
Hong Kong 3 12 0 3 2 0 0 
Ireland 15 2 1 2 0 0 0 
Israel 4 12 2 1 1 0 0 
Italy 2 10 1 1 6 0 0 
Japan 17 0 1 0 2 0 0 
Korea 10 1 5 1 3 0 0 
Netherlands 13 4 0 2 1 0 0 
New Zealand 8 5 0 5 2 0 0 
Norway 5 8 0 0 5 1 1 
Portugal 2 17 1 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 5 4 0 1 8 2 0 
Spain 8 5 3 1 1 2 0 
Sweden 6 7 0 3 1 2 1 
Switzerland 10 6 1 2 1 0 0 
United Kingdom 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 
United States 19 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 14 
Direct and indirect control of publicly held firms: ten ‘medium-size’ firms 
 
 Widely Dominant shareholder 
 
held Family 
Widely held 
non- Foreign Govern- 
Institutional 
investor Non-profit 
   financial  ment or bank  
Australia 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 
Austria 3 5 0 0 2 0 0 
Belgium 1 7 0 0 2 0 0 
Canada 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland 4 3 0 2 1 0 0 
France 2 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany 0 7 1 1 0 1 0 
Hong Kong 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 8 0 1 1 0 0 
Japan 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 
Korea 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 7 2 0 1 0 0 0 
New Zealand 5 3 0 2 0 0 0 
Norway 3 5 0 0 2 0 0 
Portugal 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 2 5 0 1 2 0 0 
Spain 3 5 0 2 0 0 0 
Sweden 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 5 3 0 2 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
United States 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
